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LocomotionAgency is an important aspect of bodily self-consciousness, allowing us to separate own movements from
those induced by the environment and to distinguish own movements from those of other agents. Unsurpris-
ingly, theoretical frameworks for agency such as central monitoring are closely tied to computational models
of sensorimotor control. Until recently agency research has largely focussed on goal‐directed movements of
the upper limbs. In particular, the inﬂuence of performance-related sensory cues and the relevance of
prediction signals for agency judgements have been studied through a variety of spatio‐temporal
mismatches between movement and the sensory consequences of movement. However, agents often
perform a different type of movement; highly automated movements that involve the entire body such as
walking, cycling, and swimming with potentially different agency mechanisms.
Here, we review recent work about agency for full‐body movements such as gait, highlighting the effects of
performance‐related visual and auditory cues on gait agency. Gait movements differ from upper limb actions.
Gait is cyclic, more rarely immediately goal-directed, and is generally considered one of the most automatic
and unconscious actions. We discuss such movement differences with respect to the functional mechanisms
of full‐body agency and body-part agency by linking these gait agency paradigms to computational models of
motor control. This is followed by a selective review of gait control, locomotion, and models of motor control
relying on prediction signals and underlining their relevance for full-body agency.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Agency
The sense of agency describes the feeling of being in control and of
being the author of one's movements. In general, one experiences
agency, if the outcome of an action corresponds to the outcome one
intended. This simple concept closely resemblesmodels of sensorimo-
tor control, which states that in order to successfully control one's
movements one has to be able to predict the immediate consequences
of one's movements and conﬁrm these predictions against the actual
sensory feedback received from the environment. Importantly, these
predictions not only allow humans to maintain and correct on-going
movements but also to effectively separate their own actions from
the environment (Jeannerod, 2003) and from actions of other agents
(Daprati et al., 1997; Jeannerod, 2004). One approach to understand-
ing themechanisms underlying agency, the central monitoring frame-
work (Frith et al., 2000b), is hence based on the internal model for
sensorimotor control proposed by Wolpert et al. (Miall and Wolpert,
1996; Wolpert et al., 1995).
The original model, shown in Fig. 1A, draws on an engineering
concept called observer framework and extended earlier thinkingeuroscience, Brain-Mind Insti-
sanne (EPFL), 1015 Lausanne,
25.
rights reserved.on oculomotor control and concepts of “corollary discharge” and
“efference copies” (Helmholtz, 1866; Sperry, 1950; von Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950). The observer framework illustrates how
i) predictive processing using forward models and ii) actual re-
afferent feedback are combined to efﬁciently control and improve
sensorimotor control without the need for additional conscious mon-
itoring. The model is generally accepted for sensorimotor control,
motor estimation, prediction, and motor learning (Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000).
How is predictive processing addressed in research paradigms in-
vestigating the sense of agency? Following early work by Nielsen
(1963, 1978), conscious action monitoring has recently been the
topic of intensive research (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Franck
et al., 2001; Knoblich et al., 2004; van den Bos and Jeannerod,
2002). In these studies participants' awareness of their movements
was measured in response to sensorimotor mismatches between vi-
sual, proprioceptive, and motor signals. The experiments introduced
a conﬂict between the predicted sensory and motor states and the ac-
tual state, which relied on deviated feedback. Among others, these
studies involved drawing a sagittal line with a stylus (Fourneret and
Jeannerod, 1998), retracing a circle (Knoblich and Kircher, 2004), or
making pointing movements using a joystick (Franck et al., 2001).
Participants were asked to repeatedly perform such goal-directed
movements during which their actual hand was hidden from view
and replaced by a virtual hand (or equivalent) that could be deviated
A B
Fig. 1. Sensorimotor control loop. A The internal model for sensorimotor control is based on an observer framework which monitors inputs and outputs of the system with minimal
cognitive inﬂuence. It uses forward models (upper branch) to efﬁciently predict future states of the system and actual sensory feedback (lower branch) to compare to these pre-
dictions. This comparison is in turn used to update the predictor and is additionally proposed to make humans aware of abnormal behaviour. Panel B depicts the introduced devi-
ation (red), automatic correction (blue), and visual feedback (green) usually observed in a goal-directed agency paradigm. The better participants correct for the deviation the
smaller the visual error in the feedback becomes potentially leading to visual “goal-capture” in agency judgements. This can be avoided e.g. by investigating agency for continuous
movements such as locomotion.
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judged whether the movement they had seen corresponded to the
movement they had just performed. Psychometric thresholds were
subsequently extracted from these responses in order to determine
the spatio-temporal limits of agency.
Apart from measuring participants' sense of agency for their
movements, these studies were important as they illustrated that
participants automatically compensated for a displayed spatial devia-
tion in order to align their hand trajectories with the visual target on
the computer screen. The participants were often unaware of their
online corrections and judged many of these actions as non-
deviated. As we will discuss throughout this review it is important
to closely inspect both motor awareness and the accompanying
motor corrections and their inﬂuence on motor awareness as such
motor corrections change the initially presented spatio-temporal de-
viation amplitudes. Unlike that of agency there is no standard mea-
sure for motor corrections, which in addition depends on the
selected agency paradigm. Motor corrections have thus been variably
based on the squared RMS (root-mean-squared) deviation from an
ideal trajectory (Fourneret et al., 2001), mapping of polar coordinates
during circle drawing (Knoblich and Kircher, 2004) or the amount of
spatial deviation compensated at the end of each trial (Kannape et al.,
2010). Detailed motion analysis in combination with agency judge-
ments will be crucial as it allows comparing the actual state of the
participant's motor system to the deviated feedback he receives.
Motor corrections reﬂect how the current estimate and the predic-
tions of future motor states are affected by the feedback and whether
suchmotor corrections precedemotor awareness (agency). Analysing
motor performance across several experimental conditions is further
necessary in order to relate it to the prevalent theoretical frameworks
for agency (Blakemore et al., 1998a; Frith, 2005) and the aforemen-
tioned computational models of sensorimotor control (Todorov and
Jordan, 2002; Wolpert et al., 1995).
Research on the sense of agency illustrated that participants self-
attributed their own movements (i.e. experienced a sense of agency
for their own movements) for feedback that was deviated in space
by up to 15° even though they unconsciously changed their move-
ment trajectories. Analogously, Franck et al. (2001) investigated the
inﬂuence of temporal cues on agency judgements. The authors intro-
duced different temporal delays between the visual position of theparticipant's hand (as seen on a computer screen) and the partici-
pant's actual hand while carrying out a pointing task. As observed
for spatial deviations, increasing delay durations between visual and
sensorimotor cues were found to decrease agency judgements (see
also Shimada et al., 2010) with subjects self-attributing delayed move-
ments below delays of 150 ms. These studies extended earlier work by
Castiello et al. (1991) showing that the generation of a goal-directed
action and the building of a conscious experience thereof are closely re-
lated, but distinct, processes.
Agency abnormalities have been observed in patients suffering
from schizophrenia, in whom abnormal action attribution (agency)
may include a variety of passivity symptoms, in particular delusions
of control (Schneider, 1955), in which such patients may attribute
agency for own actions to an external agent (or vice versa, as reviewed
in Fourneret et al., 2001; Frith et al., 2000a; Jeannerod, 2009). As senso-
rimotor control, perception, and action execution are generally intact in
these patients, it has been proposed that agency abnormalities in
schizophrenia arise due to action attribution deﬁcits (Jeannerod,
2009) resulting from cortical deﬁcits in predictive signal integration.
Such deﬁcits have also been proposed to be of relevance for
neurologically-induced abnormalities in action-awareness and sensori-
motor control such as the so-called “alien hand syndrome”, during
which movements of a body part, mostly an upper limb, are perceived
as generated by another or alien person (Feinberg et al., 1992).
These clinical examples illustrate the importance of predictive
processing for the sense of agency and for maintaining a coherent
representation of the self as a causal agent. Similarly, previous inves-
tigations of agency were important for the study of bodily self-
consciousness, but were focussed on agency for actions of ﬁngers
(Knoblich and Repp, 2009; Repp, 2005, 2006; Repp and Knoblich,
2007), hands (Daprati et al., 1997; Daprati and Sirigu, 2002;
Salomon et al., 2011; van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002), or arms
(Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Knoblich and
Kircher, 2004; Nielsen, 1963; Synofzik et al., 2006). As the partici-
pants' body position was kept constant (except for actions of ﬁnger,
hand, or arm, as indicated in Fig. 2A), these studies did not investigate
agency for more global aspects of the bodily self that have been
studied with respect to the related concept of full-body ownership
(self-identiﬁcation, self-location, and the ﬁrst-person perspective;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al.,
A B
Fig. 2. Body part and full body agency. A. Previous research paradigms have investigated body part agency by introducing a sensory mismatch between the actual location of a par-
ticipant's hand and the feedback position of the hand (grey, dotted arm and hand). In these paradigms, the participant's central reference frame— an integration of visual, vestibular,
and somatosensory information— remained undisturbed, and only the position of the body partwith respect to the central reference framewasmodiﬁed. B. The right panel illustrates the
consequences of deviating feedback for the entire bodyduring locomotion. In this setup all reference frames available to the participant are inmotion. Introducing a sensorymismatch that
applies to thewhole body disturbs the sensory integration required tomaintain this coherent reference frame as it separates one's visual position in space from the actual vestibular, sen-
sorimotor position, in effect separating or blurring one's self-localisation in space.
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the position and movement of the entire body of the participant as is
the case during locomotion. In addition to differences in the involved
sensorimotor systems between locomotion and full-body agency
(lower limbs; bilateral movements) versus body-part movements and
agency (upper limbs; unilateral movements), locomotion also gives
rise to vestibular sensations and changes in the perception of the sur-
rounding extrapersonal space, Fig. 2B, differing from changes during
arm movements in stable or sitting actors, Fig. 2A. Locomotion further
differs from upper limb actions in physiological ways: Gait is cyclic,
more rarely immediately goal-directed, and is generally considered a
highly automatic and unconscious action with important control cen-
tres in spinal cord and brainstem (Armstrong, 1988; Grillner and
Wallen, 1985). Based on these differences the sense of agency could
be expected to differ between upper-limb and full-body movements.
Investigating locomotion is therefore not only relevant for the study
of bodily self-consciousness but also for understanding agency proces-
sing for a new set of continuous movements involving the entire body.
We here discuss two novel gait agency paradigms in detail. In the sub-
sequent chapters we relate these to the internal model of sensorimotor
control and the role of predictive processing.
1.1. Spatial, visuo-motor conﬂicts and full-body agency
The ﬁrst experiment to measure gait awareness, and therefore full-
body agency (Kannape et al., 2010) was based on an original paradigm
by Nielsen (1978) and extended a more recent experiment by
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) (see Fig. 3A). Kannape et al. (2010)
provided visual feedback by tracking the participants' movements and
playing them back in real-time with the use of full-body motion cap-
ture and virtual reality technology. Participants were asked to walk
their virtual body (shown on a large projection screen in front of
them, Fig. 3A) into a virtual target cylinder in a straight line. During
some of these trials a visual sensorimotor conﬂict was introduced by
deviating the walking trajectory of the virtual body to either the leftor the right by 5°, 10°, 15°, or 30°. In order to reach the targets, partici-
pants had to compensate for the introduced deviation by
correcting their walking trajectory in the opposite direction (coloured
walking trajectories, Fig. 3B).
This setup allowed quantifying the precision with which the par-
ticipants control and monitor the displacements of their entire body
in extrapersonal space. The ﬁndings show that participants track the
position and locomotion of their body with a low accuracy within a
peripersonal space of 10–15°. As illustrated in Fig. 3C, deviations of
5°, 10°, and 15° lead to many erroneous self-attributions (in
29.2–82.9% of all trials) although participants correctly changed
their gait in order to reach the virtual target positions. This incorrect
gait agency during goal-directed locomotion and navigation suggests
that the conscious monitoring of an agent's moving body is not reli-
able and that the generation of full-body locomotion and the building
of a conscious experience of it are distinct brain processes. The value
of 10–15° above which angular biases during cyclic locomotion were
more often correctly perceived than not by our participants (no self-
attribution) was compatible with earlier work on agency for goal-
directed hand and arm movements (thresholds of 6.5°–15°; Farrer
et al., 2003; Franck et al., 2001; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004;
Posada et al., 2007; Slachevsky et al., 2001; Synofzik et al., 2006).
Importantly the participants' actual walking trajectories illustrated
that they automatically compensated for introduced spatial mis-
matches, even if they were not aware of such a mismatch, as indicated
by the agency judgement (Fig. 3B). In trials with deviations of 15°, cor-
responding to the agency threshold, participants still automatically cor-
rected their walking trajectories by 7°–8°. For the largest deviations of
30° participants reported a switch in strategy in that they now con-
sciously corrected their walking trajectories in order to complete the
task. Overall, participants compensated about 40% of the introduced
mismatch, meaning only 60% of the original mismatch remained in
the visual feedback.
A direct consequence was that the deviation in the visual feedback
became harder to detect, the better participants compensated for it
A B C
Fig. 3. Visual gait agency. A. In this study, participants' movements were tracked using a full body motion capture system. Their movements were mapped on to a grey virtual body
and played back to the participants in real-time. Their task was to reach a target cylinder randomly placed in one of four positions, 1.8 m in front of the participant. During each trial
feedback of the walking trajectory was either true (green paths, panel B) or deviated by up to 30° in either direction (dotted red line, panel A). Participants therefore had to com-
pensate in the opposite direction in order to reach the target cylinder with their virtual body (solid red trajectory, panel A). B. Walking trajectories as seen from above the room:
blue paths result from deviations to the right, red paths from deviations to the left. C. Agency ratings (light grey bars) were high for non-deviated trials and decreased with increas-
ing deviations. Importantly, participants still reported >50% agency for trials deviated by ~10° even though they correctly compensated for the mismatch (as indicated by the black
bars).
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Awareness Index (MAI) to relate agency judgements to the sensori-
motor corrections in one term. The MAI allows comparing agency
thresholds across participants (and across experimental conditions)
that do not compensate for the same deviations to the same extent.
For example, if a participant does not correct his trajectory to
compensate for a spatial deviation he would not reach the target,
his actual position would not correspond to the predicted position,
and it would be easier for that participant to detect the mismatch
based on the larger visual error. For someone who entirely compen-
sates the spatial deviation, the visual feedback contains no error and
matches the predicted position. Agency judgements are therefore
based on different sensorimotor signals in these trials. The MAI
addresses the sensitivity of agency to the predicted visual conse-
quences of one's movements with respect to the actual movement.
Furthermore, a high MAI indicates that the sensorimotor control of
full-body movements and agency for these movements may be
distinct processes because participants would even rate movements
with a strong sensorimotor conﬂict (caused by compensating for
larger angular deviations) as self-generated. The MAI allows determin-
ing how the otherwise inaccessible relationship between the initially
presented angular deviation, the resulting motor prediction and the
actual motor correction inﬂuenced agency.
Despite the different functional consequences of the movement of
a person's body part or a person's entire body, these experimental
data suggest that humans rely on comparable mechanisms for
body-part agency (i.e. arm) and agency for movements involving
the entire body such as locomotion. The authors provide additional
evidence in support of effector-independent mechanisms for agency
in a second study, by combining the gait agency paradigm with two
classical effects from the literature that investigates 1) the processing
of upright bodies (inversion) and 2) of the visuo-spatial perspective
(direction). Previous research on the perception of body postures
(Reed et al., 2003) and biological motion (Cutting et al., 1988), as
well as body-part agency (Knoblich and Kircher, 2004; Knoblich et al.,
2004), has observed a signiﬁcant decrease in the performance of per-
ceptual tasks for inverted stimuli (body postures or biological motion),
the so-called inversion effect (1). Similarly, agency judgements and
other performances decreased for stimuli rendered from a non-ego-
centred visuo-spatial perspective (David et al., 2006; Vogeley and
Fink, 2003), e.g. a 180° rotation with respect to an arm movement
(van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002) (2). Comparable mechanisms
have also been reported for the related sense of body ownership for
the upper extremity (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) (perspectival direc-
tion effect).Kannape et al. (2010) found that gait agency (without taking into
account on-going gait movements during the task) was not directly
inﬂuenced by orientation and direction of the visual feedback.
Thresholds slightly increased but not at a signiﬁcant level. However,
participants' gait movements changed signiﬁcantly and were most
accurate for familiar, upright feedback, indicating once more that au-
tomatic sensorimotor correction was more accurate than the partici-
pants' sense of agency. These two ﬁndings were reﬂected in the MAI
analysis, which revealed that taken together, the actual angular dis-
placement that resulted from the gait correction in each experimental
condition strongly affected gait agency, for inverted virtual bodies
leading to higher MAI values. Hence, larger sensorimotor mismatches
were necessary in the inverted conditions before participants became
aware of them. Taken together, these two studies suggest that the
sense of agency for full-body movements resembles that for actions
of individual body-parts as it is correspondingly affected by angular
deviations and stimulus inversion. Gait agency was not affected by
the perspectival direction of the feedback, perhaps due to the ecologi-
cal familiarity with reﬂections as in a mirror or shop window. While
further research is required, these data indicate that the mechanisms
underlying agency are independent of the effector involved, at least
for visual, goal-directed actions.
1.2. Temporal, auditory motor conﬂicts and full-body agency
Most previous work on agency has focussed on the investigation
of performance-related visual cues (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al.,
2003; Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Franck et al., 2001; Knoblich
and Kircher, 2004; Salomon et al., 2011; Shimada et al., 2010;
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002). Yet,
the majority of our actions have consequences that are apparent
across multiple sensory modalities including touch and audition. Do
mechanisms of agency differ when another sensory cue signals action
consequences? Auditory action consequences may differ in their ef-
fects from visual action consequences, as the auditory detection of
temporal discrepancies may be an especially powerful agency cue
due to the excellent timing of auditory perception. Yet, such auditory
effects on agency have only rarely been tested (Asai and Tanno, 2008;
Knoblich and Repp, 2009; Repp and Knoblich, 2007; Sato, 2008; Sato
and Yasuda, 2005). In addition, analogous to the visual paradigms de-
scribed above, most agency studies with auditory feedback have test-
ed body-part agency.
However, footstep-related auditory signals during locomotion are
probably one of the most common performance-related auditory cues
(alongside speech or eating) and likely of relevance for bodily self-
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alter gait (in Parkinson's Disease, Enzensberger and Fischer, 1996;
healthy elderly, Roerdink et al., 2011; stroke rehabilitation, Thaut et
al., 1997), but their inﬂuence on gait agency is not well understood.
This was only recently studied by Menzer et al. (2010) who investi-
gated gait agency by introducing temporal conﬂicts between foot-
steps and footstep-related auditory cues. In this free-walking
paradigm participants wore specially adapted shoes that were
equipped with open microphones. Through these shoes participants
received auditory feedback of their footsteps at different delays
while walking continuously in a 20 m by 4 m hallway. Each trial
lasted 7 s, 11 steps on average, during which participants received
feedback in real-time (16 ms) or with one of 19 random delays of
up to 1800 ms (see Fig. 4A, cf. Menzer et al., 2010, for full details).
In-line with previous reports on body-part agency, participants
gave the strongest self-attributive gait agency judgements (>90%)
in trials with the smallest temporal delays between 16 and 100 ms.
Gait agency decreased to 34% and 28% for delays between 250 and
450 ms respectively. Gait-corrected agency judgements, shown in
Fig. 4C, illustrate the systematic and predictable relationship between
agency judgements and the extent of the auditory delay: gait agency
ratings periodically peaked when the duration of the auditory delay
matched the duration of the participants' step-cycle. This was the
case for delays of a full step-cycle (1 on the abscissa) as well as delays
of a single step and three steps (0.5 and 1.5 on the abscissa). In these
latter conditions, simultaneous to taking a left footstep, participants
heard the auditory signal associated with a previous right footstep.
Participants hence could not distinguish between the sound of their
current foot-step and the sound of a previous foot-step, even if this
was produced by the contralateral foot.
Participants walked with an average step-cycle of 1.25 s
(±130 ms SD; range: 1.01–1.79 s). Surprisingly, their step-cycles var-
ied systematically with the delay period in a sinusoidal pattern
(Fig. 4B). On average individual footsteps were separated by about
600 ms, compatible with physiological data in healthy subjects
(Blanc et al., 1999; Macellari et al., 1999). Fig. 4B depicts that the
step-cycle (walking speed) showed small but systematic variations
as a function of the delay conditions. A ﬁrst maximum occurred for
~400 ms, followed by a minimum for 600 ms, a maximum for
900 ms, another minimum for 1200 ms, and a ﬁnal maximum for
1500 ms. The delay conditions with smallest step-cycle (or fastest
walking speed) overlapped with the delay conditions for which gait
agency judgements reached maximal values (compare with Fig. 4C),
comparable to those at the minimal delay (16 ms). These data further
exposed automatic changes in gait that depended on sensorimotor
conﬂicts by showing that participants' walking speed depended onA B
Fig. 4. Auditory gait agency. A. In this study participants were asked to walk along an empt
either be delivered in real-time (16 ms delay) or with a randomised delay of up to 1800 m
tionally perceived feedback delayed by the equivalent of one or multiple steps delay as true
portantly, as already measured in the visual gait agency task, participants unconsciously ch
delay of the auditory feedback.the delay period, increasing after each stride and decreasing at each
stride, although they were not aware of this and were instructed to
walk at a comfortable speed throughout the experiment.
The temporal thresholds reported by the authors for these audio-
motor cues were similar for judging delays between visuo-motor
cues, as reported for studies on body-part agency. This was found
even though the temporal resolution of the auditory system is higher
than the temporal resolution of the visual system. The delay values of
~100–200 ms are far above the threshold for auditory temporal order
judgements of ~20 ms (Hirsh, 1959; Hirsh and Sherrick, 1961; cited
in Knoblich and Repp, 2009). We therefore suggest that this similarity
reﬂects common, modality-independent or supramodal, mechanisms
in agency for auditory and visual gait consequences. This is compati-
ble with a comparison of the predicted and actual consequences of
actions and gait (Frith et al., 2000b) that has been proposed to be
independent of the sensory modality tested. However, given the rela-
tive rarity of studies testing the effects of performance-related audito-
ry cues on agency (especially gait agency) and the lack of studies
comparing the effects of visual and auditory cues on agency directly
in the same subjects, this has to be regarded with caution and may
depend on the employed agency manipulation and task and may fur-
ther differ between explicit and implicit agency judgements (Repp
and Knoblich, 2007). Nonetheless the study by Menzer et al. (2010)
yielded comparable effects to the visual-motor paradigm mentioned
above suggesting that the sense of agency is both supramodal and
effector independent processes including cyclic full-body actions
such as gait.
2. Predictive processing in agency
Since its introduction the observer framework for sensorimotor
control has been adapted and extended to the concept of central
monitoring in order to account for cognitive disorders, schizophrenic
symptoms (Frith et al., 2000a), a range of abnormalities in motor
awareness (Blakemore et al., 2002; Frith et al., 2000b) and as a neuro-
cognitive model of agency as a whole. In the following we will discuss
the approach of previous agency paradigms with respect to the orig-
inal internal model for sensorimotor control as proposed by Wolpert
et al. (1995) and argue that this sufﬁces to explain most of the
observed automatic corrections. However, the novel ﬁndings from re-
search on gait agency reviewed here imply that a simple expansion of
this model cannot account for an understanding of all aspects of the
sense of agency. Continuous full-body movements can be used to
challenge the central monitoring framework and to emphasise the
pre-reﬂective aspects of agency, sometimes referred to as a “feeling
of agency” (David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008).C
y corridor while receiving auditory feedback from their own footsteps. Feedback could
s. C Participants correctly recognised real-time feedback to be self-generated but addi-
, i.e. they could not distinguish between their current and a previous step-cycle. B Im-
anged their gait parameters and systematically changed their stride-time based on the
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Whenwe perform an action ourmovement intention, or immediate
goal, is translated into a motor command by an internal inverse model,
often referred to as a controller. This controller translates an abstract
goal into patterns of joint movements and muscle activations. An effer-
ence copy of the motor command is produced and used to predict the
sensorimotor consequences of the ensuing movement. This so-called
forward model predicts the next state of the system given the current
state and the efference copy (upper branch in Fig. 1A). In the forward
model, this happens before any sensory feedback is available. One ad-
vantage of the forward model is that movements can be planned and
adjusted without the need to wait for sensory feedback which can be
delayed by up to 250 ms (Miall et al., 1993), which is one of the reasons
why such models have ﬁrst been proposed for ballistic movements,
such as eye movements (Sperry, 1950; von Holst and Mittelstaedt,
1950). Simultaneously, the sensory consequences of the action are pre-
dicted using a sensory forward model (lower branch, Fig. 1A) and is for
example used to attenuate the sensory consequences following self-
initiated movements. The predicted sensory feedback is compared to
the actual, re-afferent sensory feedback. Small mismatches between
predicted and actual feedback are subsequently used to update the cur-
rent state estimate. The crucial comparator mechanism then compares
the predicted state of the motor system with its corrected, actual esti-
mate to improve the predictor and correct an on-going movement.
Evidence in favour of the ﬁrst comparator (comparison between pre-
dicted and actual sensory feedback) stems from a study by Blakemore et
al., who showed — based on earlier work by Weiskrantz et al. (1971) —
that humans attenuate the sensory response to self-generated stimula-
tion as illustrated by the fact that one cannot tickle oneself (Blakemore
et al., 1998b, 2000). Evidence in favour of the second comparator (com-
parison between predicted and actual states of the motor system) and
the understanding that the internal model of sensorimotor control
functions as an optimal state estimator is provided by Wolpert et al.
(1995). In this task participants were asked to estimate the position of
their hand after performing a reaching task, undisturbed or against im-
posed external forces and without visual feedback. These data strongly
favour an internal model of sensorimotor control that makes trade-offs
between an internal forward model and actual sensory feedback. This
second comparator has recently received much attention for its pro-
posed role in bodily self-consciousness as it is assumed that the sense
of agency crucially depends on its output.
2.2. Movement correction and agency
The paradigms introduced by Torsten Nielsen and later by Marc
Jeannerod and colleagues were important as they quantiﬁed the
limits of conscious access humans have to these sensorimotor control
mechanisms. Thus, for upper hand movements participants were not
aware of deviations of up to 15° between the position of their actual
occluded hand and the position of their seen virtual hand, even
though they automatically corrected for these deviations. This correc-
tion is compatible with the aforementioned control mechanism, as
participants non-consciously adjusted their movement trajectories
based on discrepancies between predicted and actual state estimate
which was experimentally deviated in space or time. This suggests
that the comparator mechanism is accurate enough to correct small
deviations automatically but that one does not have conscious access
(or insight) into this process. Instead, this mechanism controls for the
many smaller perturbations and only creates a conscious break in
agency, if sensory mismatches become too large to be considered a
false alarm.
Two open questions resulted from this line of research: 1) what
are the limits and complexity of motor compensation (state correc-
tion) we may perform unconsciously and 2) which error cue is
more important to the sense of agency — the experimentally inducederror in audio-visual feedback or the state-correction within the sen-
sorimotor control loop. In previous studies these questions were
often not addressed either because participants never became fully
aware of their corrective motor performance (e.g. Fourneret and
Jeannerod, 1998; Nielsen, 1963) or because the movement data was
not discussed relative to the agency ratings (or simply unavailable,
e.g. Franck et al., 2001; Leube et al., 2003).
Investigating agency using locomotion (gait agency) has provided
insights into both of these questions. First and with respect to the
complexity of the movements, the studies highlighted in this review
illustrate that we are able to automatically adjust our gait, similar to
adjustments for movements of the upper limbs although gait agency
can differ as seen for a perspectival change in feedback. Apart from
the complexity of this movement, human locomotion differs from
reaching movements in other ways. Walking towards a target desti-
nation 2 m ahead or along a 20 m corridor requires a series of coordi-
nated motor-sequences as opposed to the ballistic movements made
for example in a pointing task (cf. Bridgemen et al., 1981). This
suggests that in order to successfully complete this task, gait
corrections are subdivided and coordinated literally step by step.
Next to the complexity of corrective gait movements, these locomo-
tion paradigms also delineate the limits of automatic sensorimotor
correction. In order to compensate for the largest delays in the goal-
directed walking paradigm (Kannape et al., 2010) for example, partic-
ipants reported consciously adjusting their walking trajectories similar
to the switch in motor-compensation reported in Slachevsky et al.
(2001, 2003) for arm-movements . This change in strategy occurred
for deviations of about 15° and motor compensation of about 7°–8°. It
is therefore possible that this threshold, whichmarks a maximum “lee-
way” for automatic sensorimotor control, is used as an indicator that an
action is no longer fully controlled by oneself and directly impacts the
experience of agency. As will be discussed in the next section, the
magnitude of this threshold determines the remaining visual error in
the feedback (Fig. 1B) and may point to a potential bias inherent in
goal-directed agency paradigms which can be avoided by investigating
agency for continuous movements.
The notion that agency judgements may be based rather on the
sensorimotor conﬂict introduced by automatic compensation then
the introduced visual/auditory conﬂict in the feedback is further sup-
ported by a series of studies by Knoblich and Kircher (2004) in which
participants performed a drawing task during which the relative
velocity between their actual movement and its visual consequences
was perturbed. In one of the conditions participants were asked to
stop drawing as soon as they detected the mismatch. The results con-
ﬁrmed that motor correction always preceded conscious awareness
of a mismatch. Varraine et al. (2002) demonstrated partly analogue
results for treadmill walking. In this experiment participants uncon-
sciously adjusted their walking characteristics, force or speed, for
about 6 s even though they were explicitly asked to report these
changes as soon as they arose (although this delayed awareness
may result from a difference in the paradigm as perturbations were
only increased gradually and no visual feedback was available to the
participants). Data from a deafferented patient further supports that
agency judgements may be based on the sensorimotor compensation
as opposed to the visual feedback. This patient correctly compensated
for visually represented spatial deviations, but — due to lack of re-
afferent haptic signals — never became aware of the deviations or
the own motor correction (Fourneret et al., 2002). Even though the
prediction and updating of sensorimotor control were accurate, the
actual estimate of the current state was solely based on the visual
feedback, which matched the state intended by the patient. Taken to-
gether these ﬁndings underline the necessity to closely analyse partic-
ipant movements in agency studies and relate them systematically to
their conscious reports of agency. For one, they give insight into the
magnitude and complexity of motor corrections that are performed
automatically and point to dissociations between agency and motor
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motor corrections pass a threshold, such as the 7°–8° in the goal-
directed walking paradigm (during trials with a visual deviation close
to the threshold, i.e. 15°), this dissociation is bridged and we become
aware of the sensorimotor corrections.
2.3. Agency and sensorimotor control for continuous movements
All of these agency paradigms illustrate that small error signals,
environmental noise and even experimentally induced deviations
are seamlessly integrated to update and correct one's on-going move-
ments (Faisal et al., 2008). However, it has been suggested that the
goal-directedness of these studies presents a cognitive bias, which
causes one to remain largely unaware of conﬂicting sensory feedback
about the actual state of one's motor system as long as one's intended
goal has been achieved (Blakemore et al., 2002). Unlike movements
in previous reaching, grasping, and drawing tasks locomotion is
inherently continuous and often not immediately goal-directed. In-
vestigating gait agency can therefore avoid this cognitive inﬂuence
of task-completion. The foot-step related auditory experiment on
gait agency particularly underscores this point. Participants were
performing a continuous walking task that was not goal-directed.
Nonetheless they integrated the continuous auditory feedback of
their foot-steps into the sensorimotor loop as illustrated by the
change in walking speed and this change was independent of the par-
ticipants' agency judgements. According to the comparator model the
delayed feedback causes a mismatch between the predicted sound of
the footstep and the actual feedback. This sensory error will be used
to correct the estimated state of the sensorimotor system, see
Fig. 1A (Wolpert et al., 1995). This state correction would propagate
that the timing of the current state estimate was inaccurate and result
in an adaptation of timing and therefore walking speed. This is
supported by the fact that the amount of change in walking speed ob-
served by Menzer et al. (2010) corresponded to the level of mismatch
between predicted and actual feedbacks. This hypothesis is further
supported by two recent experiments which showed that delayed
haptic gait feedback (vibration of the foot soles, Watanabe and
Ando, 2010) as well as delayed visual feedback of one's own gait
(Kannape and Blanke, 2010) caused participants to systematically ad-
just their walking speed. Thus, participants integrated the
performance-related feedback independent of whether or not partic-
ipants perceive the same feedback to be self-generated.
An important novelty introduced by these paradigms is that the
gait movements could change independently of the agency ratings.
In previous goal-directed reaching tasks, agency always closely fol-
lowed the magnitude of the visual mismatch and the strength of the
resulting motor correction. Yet, the data reviewed here show that
gait agency and gait movements can change separately as the ob-
served gait changes are to some extent task-irrelevant (Menzer et
al., 2010; Kannape and Blanke, 2010). This is also of interest for the
central monitoring theorem (Frith et al., 2000b), as in this case, agen-
cy judgements can neither rely on the success or failure in reaching a
target nor can they be based on the amount of underlying motor cor-
rection. Synchronising the gait to the underlying rhythm could be a
means to minimising uncertainty about whether or not one is the
agent responsible for the received feedback (Wolpert et al., 2011). If
gait was temporally synchronous to the feedback, even if left-right re-
versed, the (temporal) error in the motor-system would be cancelled
out. Accordingly, uncertainty about agency would be limited to spa-
tial differences in visual feedback or qualitative differences for audito-
ry feedback.
2.4. The neuroscience of gait and agency
Although gait has initially been considered a largely automatic ac-
tion regulated mainly by subcortical control mechanisms includingthe brainstem and spinal cord (Armstrong, 1988; Grillner and Wallen,
1985), recent work has highlighted the inﬂuence of attention, execu-
tive function and other cognitive mechanisms (Hausdorff, 2005;
Shaw, 2002; Yogev-Seligmann et al., 2008). Walking is a complex
task involving the integration of locomotion, balance, and adaptation
in an ever-changing environment (Armstrong, 1988; Blanc et al.,
1999; Drew et al., 2004). However, the neuroscience of human upright
gait is hampered by two main caveats. Neuroimaging using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography
(MEG), or electroencephalography (EEG) is currently not available or
severely limited in walking humans (Fukuyama et al., 1997; Miyai et
al., 2001) and humans are the only truly upright walking primates
(Eccles, 1989). Only recently Independent Component Analysis and
template based artefact removal have been applied to EEG recordings
to recover and examine electrocortical activity coupled to the human
gait-cycle (Gwin et al., 2011). More work along these lines is mandato-
ry. The few studies that have been conducted point to a distributed
network for locomotion including spinal cord, brainstem, basal ganglia,
cerebellum, motor and posterior parietal cortices (for motor cortex see
Armstrong, 1988; Drew et al., 2004; for spinal cord: Grillner and
Wallen, 1985; Nutt et al., 1993).
Despite these recent efforts, neuroscience of walking is thus
almost entirely based on ﬁndings in quadrupeds and behavioural
work in patients with gait disorders and is currently absent for gait
agency. One relevant group to investigate both with respect to loco-
motion as well as the sense of agency and voluntary motor control
are patients suffering from Parkinson's disease. Gait-impairments
such as asymmetry or freezing-of-gait are well documented
(Browner and Giladi, 2010; Morris et al., 1994), as is the underlying
pathology (Agid and Blin, 1987; Alexander et al., 1986), but beyond
the scope of the current review. Although initial work on agency-
related processing in Parkinsonism has been published by Moore et
al. (2010b), further research is required to systematically link such
ﬁndings to models of sensorimotor control, locomotion, and upper-
limb and gait agency. We also mention that upper-limb agency has
been addressed in a number of functional brain imaging studies re-
vealing a distributed network of involved brain areas (reviewed by
David et al., 2008) that includes supplementary motor area (Farrer
and Frith, 2002; Moore et al., 2010a), the cerebellum (Blakemore et
al., 2001) but also associative cortices, i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (Fink et al., 1999), posterior parietal cortex (Farrer et al., 2003;
Farrer and Frith, 2002), posterior superior temporal sulcus (Leube et
al., 2003) and the insula (Cunnington et al., 2006).
The gait agency paradigmswe have reviewed here are attractive for
investigating agency for a number of reasons. As mentioned above,
locomotion is a complex but highly practised, largely automatic action
that involves the entire, spatially situated body. Unsurprisingly, similar
to the observer framework for sensorimotor control, locomotion is
mostly regulated unconsciously and is rarely immediately goal-
directed. Investigating gait agency using locomotion can therefore re-
move confounds such as reaching a target location as could the study
of agency for ﬁnger tapping-movements (i.e. Knoblich and Repp,
2009; Repp and Knoblich, 2007). Furthermore, the study of gait agency
opens up the possibility of applying paradigms such as dual tasking to
investigate bodily self-consciousness and the sense of agency and relat-
ed functions of spatial navigation and path integration (Glasauer et al.,
2009; Loomis et al., 1993; Wolbers and Hegarty, 2010). This is impor-
tant as humans may perform many perceptual, motor, and cognitive
tasks while walking, potentially causing performance in these tasks to
decline or change. Additionally these secondary tasks have been
shown to alter gait characteristics and even lead to freezing or falls
(for comprehensive reviews see Woollacott and Shumway-Cook,
2002; and Yogev-Seligmann et al., 2008). Thus, cognitive tasks such
as verbal ﬂuency (Dubost et al., 2006), ﬁne-motor movements (Yang
et al., 2007), and arithmetics (van Iersel et al., 2007) have been
shown to alter gait characteristics ranging from walking velocity, over
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((Dubost et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2007); van Iersel et al., 2007).
While there is a growing literature on the effects of cognitive loading
on gait characteristics as well as postural control little is known about
its effects on the sense of agency for movements (neither for the arm
nor the entire body). Importantly, the combination of gait agency par-
adigms with cognitive loading may be able to illustrate the effect of re-
source availability on predictive processing and the sense of agency
with respect to potential changes in the internal model of sensorimotor
control.
In conclusion, we discussed that predictive processing, as intrinsi-
cally used for sensorimotor control, plays an important role in the
sense of agency including locomotion. Only by comparing the pre-
dicted state of our movements to their consequences can we attribute
actions to the correct agent, allowing us in turn to separate ourselves
from the environment and from other agents around us. The central
monitoring theorem presents an appropriate framework to investi-
gate the sense of agency from a sensorimotor perspective and exper-
imental paradigms have successfully illustrated the limits of
conscious access to sensorimotor control. However, the gait agency
paradigms reviewed here suggest that extending this framework to
account for continuous full-body movements such as locomotion is
not trivial. In these studies, sensorimotor control was not used to di-
rectly compensate for spatio-temporal deviations and could change
independently of the perceived sense of agency. Extending agency
paradigms to include human locomotion will allow reﬁning the cen-
tral monitoring framework for the sense of agency and open up
new avenues of research by linking approaches from the ﬁeld of agen-
cy to bodily self-consciousness, path integration, and spatial
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